THE term economic democracy has been used so loosely by so many writers in the popular press and elsewhere that it is in danger of having no meaning at all or any meaning anyone cares to give it. Since this is what commonly happens to a concept which expresses some real, popular aspirations, we need not view the fact with too much concern. But some attempt at clear definitiOn is necessary. Economic democracy, then, may be defined as an economic order which would make possible the realization of the purposes or values which political democracy can no longer realize by itself. Alternatively it may be defined as an economic order which would make democracy work, or permit it to be more nearly democratic. Such a definition, I believe, comes close to stating the essential meaning of the phrase) economic democracy. For it should be noticed that it is not just a question of what meaning the term could possibly have. It is a question of finding in. the term some meaning at once fairly definite and fairly real, that is, expressing the real hopes and intentions of those who use the t. erm. We are tryingto understand a real movement, or rather an idea which the adherents of many movements-trade unionists, new dealers, co-operators, socialists-share to a greater or lesser extent. That idea is not conveyed by a mere literal interpretation of the two words, economic democracy. Yet it is not necessary to go as far as Professor Macl ver, who, after showing with deceptive clarity that a strict interpretation of the words gives an absurd result, goes on to argue that e~onomic democracy is a ((questionbegging phrase,'' involving a "misuse of language" against which he emphatically protests.l
We may agree with Professor Mad ver that this strict meaning of the words does not convey the real' notion embodied in the phrase. But I do not b~lieve that the phrase is therefore a misuse of language or an unfair attempt to capture the word democracy, with all its favourable connotations, for proposals which are not essentially democratic. If we think of democracy as not merely a lR. M. Maciver, Leviathan and the People (Louisiana, 1939) 1 pp. 84-6. set of institutions-popular parties and majority rule-but as a set of purposes or ends to which these institutions are but means, it is surely legitimate to hold that any other institutions, including economic ones, which can be shown to be also essential means to the democratic ends are equally entitled to the shelter and support of the word democracy. I conclude therefore that the phrase economic democracy may fairly be used to mean such an arrangement of the economic system as is believed to be a necessary means to the ends which democratic thinkers and movements have always sought. Proposals for economic democracy today are proposals for such rearrangements of the relations between capital and labour and the state as the proponents believe necessary to make democracy real.
So much for definition. It is apparent that this definition raises more problems than it settles, as is the way with definitions. \Vhat are the ends or purposes of democracy? Why is a rearrangement of economic relations necessary today to provide any chance of those ends being realized? What rearrangements are most likely to provide their realization? These are the main questions to which this article is devoted. And luckily they are not entirely abstract questions. They are questions partly of poll tical philosophy and partly of administration, but even in so far as they are questions of political philosophy they exist in a definite historical setting. The democratic philosophy has been stated by generations of democratic thinkers; the forces which have to be contended with, as well as t'he forces which may aid, in the attempt to realize this philosophy today are capable of historical and empirical analysis.
To come to the first of these questions: What are the essential ends which democratic thinkers and movements have commonly proposed and sought? The basic postulate of democrats is the equal humanity of every individual, the belief that each human being has a life to live as much as any other human being, and, therefore, that each has a right to live it as fully as his capacities allow, always, of course, so far as is consistent with others having the same right. Democracy, in other words, is, and has always been, a protest against the class privilege which prevents some people, by reason of their class position, from having-equal access with . others to the means of self-development. The purpose of democratic movements, the essential democratic end, has always been to secure the conditions for the equal consideration of indi-vi duals in this . sense. (Or it might be more accurate to say that the purpose of democratic movements has always been to break down the institutional obstacles to such equality of consideration; and jt may be suggested in passing that it is because democracy has seemingly taken this negative form that it has been so open to attack by the seemingly positive, but in reality barren creeds of fascism.)
It has been easy enough for democratic thinkers to show that among the conditions for this equal consideration were the political institutions which have since been Ia.rgely realized in modern democratic states: equality before the law, adult franchise and periodical elections to ensure the responsibility of the government to the majority, and freedom of speech, pubiication and association, without which minorities can not make their voices heard nor have the opportunity of becoming majorities. However, after these political institutions were achieved, or even before they were at all fully achieved, it began to be-apparent that these were not the only things necessary if the democratic end was to have a chance of being realized. For the economic system was developing in a way which necessarily rendered political democracy less effective towards realizing the democratic end than the earlier proponents of deInocracy had thought it would be.
If we look at this development we shall be on our way towards answering the second and third questions: Why is a rearrangement of economic relations necessary today to provide a chance of the democratic end being realized? And what sort of rearrangement is most likely to do it? It should be said at once that it is very doubtful whether the democratic end can ever be _ realized at all fully. It was one of the fathers of the United States of A-merica who asked, "What is government itself but the greatest of all reflections on human nature?" 2 And at about the same time Voltaire remarked that the dispute between democracy and monarchy "always ends in an admission that it is v~ry difficult to govern men." 3 But if we agree with these views of the limitations of politics, it is still open to us to seek as thoroughly and work as vigorously for farreaching changes as the American federalists and Voltaire did in their day. Differences in .the form of government may be matters of degree, but we have come to see these differences of degree assume such immensity that they fill our whole horizon.
It is worth while, therefore, to consider in what ways modern economic development has raised obstacles to the realization of the democratic philosophy. It has done so on two levels. It has, :first, in various ways necessarily distorted the democratic political process so that the standard political institutions of the .democratic state do not automatically secure that equal consultation of the interests of all, which they were expected to secure. It has, secondly, raised new obstacles to equality of opportunity and equality of consideration within the sphere of the economic relations of individuals. For great numbers of individuals, the ways in which they must get their living have been altered and narrowed; the kind of life they may live has been similarly confined. Both the distortion of the democratic process and the narrowing of the sphere of individual opportunity have flowed from the increasing inequality of _wealth and the increasing concentration of economic power, which have been among the natural results of the development of modern capitalism. The contrast between the rough equality of the pioneer farming community and the class divisions in America today provides the sharpest picture of this development. No amount of talk about the growth of a new "middle class" of technicians and professional people, which the development of capitalism has also called into being, can do more than temporarily obscure the real growth of inequality and the real concentration of control. 4 The ways in which this inequality of wealth and concentration of economic power operate today to inhibit the democratic process are not so obscure as to require any long analysis. In so far as access to information is a prerequisite of intelligently effective voting, the control of the press and other sources of information by necessarily large capital interests is an obvious factor in preventing the free play of the democratic process. Political parties, which are apparently indispensable for the working of any large-scale democratic system, are expensive to organize and have tended naturally to move in the orbit of property interests. Labour parties can be organized, but their organization and maintenance must be continually handicapped. Back of the parties, in the democratic process, stand the many associa.tions representing the interests of occupational, religious, racial, and other sections of the whole community. These "pressure groups"-to use the jargon of political science-have become (on this continent at least, because of the comprehensiveness of political parties) more effective channels than the parties for bringing individual wills to bear on the policy of the state. It is easy to observe that the pressure groups which represent property interests, or which can command wealth, have an influence far out of proportion to the numbers they represent. All this is elementary, but it is well to remind ourselves that in these and other ways the modern concentration of wealth and economic power automatically operates to distort the democratic process.
That political power is very apt to be in the hands of those who have economic power has been a commonplace of political science at least since Aristotle. The only thing that is new is that political power still tends to follow property, in spite of the completely democratic franchise. The wonder perhaps is that it should ever have been thought that the existence of democratic political institutions alone would seriously modify this age-old rule. As a matter of fact, American democratic thinkers in the eighteenth century did not think it would. That power always follows property was a favourite theme of Jefferson and John Taylor and Noah Webster. "Wherever we cast our eyes,'' the last-named wrote, "we see the truth, that property is the basis of power ... . " 5 And they drew from this the conclusion that, in Taylor's words: "Wealth, like suffrage, must be considerably distributed, to sustain a democratic republic. . . . As power follows wealth, the majority must have wealth or lose power." 6 These democrats therefore urged various measures to prevent the concentration of wealth and the emergence of a large unpropertied class. They saw as their chief enemy the new financial and commercial corporations, through which the pr~cess of concentration was already beginning. Taylor denounced corporate property as the very opposite of private property, since it grew at the expense of private property. "If the fruit of labor is private property," he asked, "can stealing this fruit from labour also make private property?" And he concluded: "Tythes and stock, invented to take away private property, are as correctly called private property as a guillotine could be called a head." 7 It was, however, too late even then to prevent the rise of corporate capitalism. The appeal to the individualist right to the fruits of labour, against the corporate right to unlimited corporate · property, was unavailing. All the democratic reform movements' in the nineteenth century, most of which based themselves on such an appeal, failed to stop the advance of capitalism and the everincreasing concentration of wealth and of economic control. The essential antagonism between democracy and the distribution of property, which the Jeffersonian democrats foresaw, was becoming greater every decade. Yet, for the most part, during the nineteenth century this antagonism was prevented from developing fully. In America the existence of-free land on the western frontier provided a measure of equality of opportunity, which diluted the concentration of wealth and mitigated its effects. In England the policy of economic imperialism brought a stream of profits, which made possible a continuous series of concessions to the working class by way of social legislation and state social services. Thus in both England and America the underlying antagonism between democracy and the concentration of property has not fully emerged until this century, and has not been widely perceived until fairly recently, although there have always been some-groups who have seen it and tried to act on it. · During_ the period when the antagonism was latent, politics in a democratic state became the art of adjusting the claims of the various interest groups, and democracy came in general to be regarded as a system of government which could satisfy everybody by giving free play to groups. This was an extension of the policy of laissez-jaire 3 with which democratic government was associated from the beginning. But this picture of the democratic process is a recognizable portrait only to the extent that the frontier or the expanding economy is preventing the changes in the distribution of property from having the effects which the Jeffersonians foresaw. As the frontier and the expanding-that is, the sufficiently expanding-economy have disappeared, the basic difficulty of democracy has emerged. The right which it was once the chief object of the · democrats to secure, because it was then regarded as a right without which the free and equal individual could not attain his full stature-i.e. the right to the unrestricted use of private propertyhas now become incompatible with most individuals' attainment of that stature. The inference drawn by an exponent of economic democracy is that the unrestricted right to property must go if real democracy is to have a chance.
It is obvious that the unrestricted right to property has gone to some extent already. State regulation and state intervention in economic life have become familiar features in every industrial state. Part of this, of course, has come at the request of various sections of the industrial and commercial property interests, who have rightly or wrongly indentified their own with the national . interests. Tariffs, subsidies, state control or regulation of transport and eiectric-power facilities and rates, are examples of this sort of intervention, which is (or is intended to be) favourable to property. But other types of state intervention have come as a result of democratic pressure from the working class and from those of small property. Minimum-wage legislation, unemployment-relief policies, trade-union legislation, housing and rent control, may be cited as examples of this type of intervention, not to . m~ntion the state provision of free educa~ion and other social services, which constitutes an indirect transfer of wealth.
The pressure which has brought these measures of state intervention continues, and is one of the forms which the demand for economic democracy is taking today. Now, these measures are well enough in themselves-they lessen the sense of insecurity and provide some things which are of human value to those who would not have them if left to their own devices and to the mercies of impersonal economic forces. Such measures may therefore be regarded as instalments of economic democracy. But these measures so far have not essentially altered ' the concentration of property and of economic power which we have seen to be an obstacle to the democratic political process. It may be objected that if the organized working class has been able to get all the concessions just mentioned by using the democratic political process, then there seems to be no serious obstacle to their continuing to do so. It is hazardous to predict how serious the obstacle is or may become in any country, .but clearly there may be a limit to the concessions that the owners are willing to make. A limit is likely to be reached at the point where the expectations of both classes cannot be met out of a no longer sufficiently expanding economy.
With those who have seen the seriousness of this obstacle, the dem~nd for economic democracy has become a demand for a more radical redistribution of economic power than any that has taken place so far. With some, this has taken the form of a demand for the socialization of all productive property; with others it is a demand that existing democratic states should rapidly increase their control over all spheres of economic activity so that the politically democratic state should gather to itself most of the econom1c power.
II
If my analysis of the present hindrances to the fuller working of the democratic political process is correct, it would follow that either of these proposals, to the extent that it was workable, would remove the hindrances. That is, these proposals seem to be broad answers to-the third question: What rearrangement of economic relations is likeJy to provide a chance of the democratic ends being · realized? But it is well to observe the difficulties in each of these answers.
The socialist proposal means the taking over of all private capital by the state. It is probable that the property-owners would resist this. If so, and if they were prepared to resist by force, there would be a period of struggle in which the existing degree of democracy would disappear, since democracy is possible only so long as there is general agreement to be bound by the decision of the majority. -And if a socialist majority should be successful in such a struggle, there can be no guarantee in advance that substantial democracy would then be introduced, although that would have been the purpose of the whole attempt. It is a difficult thing to return from a basis of force to a basis of agreement, although the return to a basis of agreement has been the outcome of all the successful revolutions of the ·past.
The other proposal-that the existing democratic state should so extend its controls as to become the real centre of economic power, thus giving democratic control over the corporate concen-. tration of wealth while leaving corporate private ownership of capital-tries to avoid the main difficulty of the socialist proposal.
But it is open to question whether, in trying to avoid that difficulty, it does not also avoid or even aggravate the problem it was intended to meet. For it is probable that a government which got that much control over capital would find itself more than ever controlled by the representatives of capital. There are, for instance, excellent reasons of efficiency why_ the various controllers appointed by .the Canadian government to administer the price ceiling and other measures of war-time economic control, have usually been chosen from the outstanding private enterprisers in each of the branches of industry and commerce which is to be regulated. These men presumably bring with them to their new work their lifelong attitudes of mind. Thus the admin1strative reaches of the government are likely to . be permeated with the business-man's view as to the respective rights of capital and government. There is no doubt that they will modify such views where the exigences of war require it, but we cannot expect such modification to be carried over after the end of the war. We may assume that there will be a period of several years of post-war reconstruction during which an elaborate mechanism of governmental controls of the econ' omic system will be just as necessary as it has been during the war. If, in such a post-war period, the representatives of private capital play as large a part as they do now, it is questionable whether the state control of economic life would be a great step in the direction of economic democracy. And 1 t is in this context of war and postwar controls that any proposals for reaching economic democracy by way of government control will have to operate. vVe can at least say that if the government control of economic life is to yield any economic democracy, there will have to be a very strong, conscious and well-organized popular movement continually pressing on the government. · There is a further difficulty, common to the proposal for complete socialization and the proposals for the extension of state control over private economic enterprise. This is, that any attempt by a state to take over any considerable measure of economic control means that the people have to place more power in the hands of the government. A greater concentration of political power is needed to give the government the strength to deal with the already great concentration of economic power. The people must yield extraordinary powers to the government; they must forgo some of that democratic control which they are seeking to increase. Further, the government must set up an enormous structure of boards and bureaus and departments, with permanent staffs of professional economists and professional administrators; and the more complicated their work becomes, the more indispensable and hence the more powerful they become. In other wo'tds, in addition to the special difficulty of the possible· permeation of the administrative level of government by the private-enterprise outlook, there is the general difficulty of the. necessarily increasing strength of both the executive goverriment (that is, cabinet or president) and the civil service. This tendency towards increasing the power of the executive government and of the civil service is not, of course, merely a theoretical forecast; it is a statement of what is already happening. Government by executive order has become the rule rather than the exception. This is not simply the result of present war urgencies; the tendency is fifty years old in England and it has been a very obvious trend in the United States at least since the inception of the New Deal.
The danger is, then, that any government which takes over substantial control of the economy will in the process become much less responsive to parliament or congress and to the democratically expressed will of the people. How great is this danger? I do not believe that there is any insuperable mechanical obstacle to the democratic control of a strong executive and a bureaucracy, provided that the people are determined to exercise some control. Those who see the decline 'of parliament and congress in the fact that these bodies have handed over so much of their law-making power to the executive, sometimes overlook the existence of organized interest groups, which, when the power of parliament declines, increase their direct pressure on government at the executive and civil service level. Government by pressure groups is not as democratic as .an ideal government by parliament, for reasons I · have mentioned, but it is a good deal more democratic than government by an unchecked bureaucracy. And it could be made even more democratic by an extension of the system of continuous consultative and advisory committees, in which there is direct and open contact between the various government departments and the representatives of the organizations whose members would be affected-farmers, teachers, manufacturers, metal-workers, milkproducers, and so on. This development has already gone a considerable distance in England s and can be taken further; it is a method of regularizing lobbying and depriving it as far as possible of its sinister implications.
Such standing consultative committees may of course be intentionally or unintentionally ineffective; we do not need to look far Central Government, 1919 -1939 (London, 1940 for examples. There are few governments which do not move by covering their exposed flanks with a network of committees. The National Labour Supply Council, set up by Canadian order-incouncil in June, 1940, <'to advise on any matter touching labour supply ... referred to it by. the Minister of Labour," and consisting of an equal number of representatives of employers and of labour~ has been regarded by at least some trade-union officials who have had experience with it~ as an unreal body which is consulted after the real decisions have been made, or is given inadequ'ilte time to consider important matters which are formally proposed to it. Advisory or consultative committees can be made more real only by the ever-stronger organization of those who want them to be made real, and by the wider general recognition of what is at stake. \Vith an extension of such mechanisms, and of other devices which recent students of public administration have suggested for making the reviewing power of parliament more effective, 9 it should not beimpossible to provide for at least as great a measure of control by representatives of the people as any that has hitherto beet! exercised.10 It should be emphasized, however, that such mechanisms themselves are of no use unless -there is in the country a continuous, widespread and organized demand that they shall be made to work. Devices, for instance, for making more effective parliament's review of the actions of the executive are of no use if parliament seldom meets. The contrast between the recent practice of Canada and Great Britain in this respect is very disturbing, whether it is taken as a reflection on the Canadian public or on parliament or on the government.
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If there is no insuperable mechanical obstacle to the democratic control of a government which controls the economic system, there still remains another difficulty. It has often been said that power corrupts the holders of power, that those who are put in power by a democratic reform movement begin well, but come to value power for its own sake and direct their policy towards g~tting and keeping a monopoly of power for themselves. Much of the dis- trust, for instance, of the socialist theory of a transitional period either of dictatorship or at least of strong executive control, may be traced to the fear that the period would not be transitional. And the cry of dictatorship which has been raised against popular Presidentsof the United States, from Andrew Jackson to Franklin Roosevelt, is supported by the same line of reasoning. It will not be denied that highly-concentrated executive power is dangerous from the democratic point of view. Yet it may be observed that -the danger has been deliberately exaggerated by the interested opponents of democracy. This is an old technique of those whose privileges are threatened. By declaiming against the great powers which have been given to the popular le9-der, they hope to divert popular· attention from the great undemocratic p· owers they themselves have exercised and are trying to protect. Usually their arguments are plausible;· as Tom Paine said of that most splendid spokesman of privilege, Edmund Burke, "he has moun ted in the. air like a balloon, to draw the eyes of the multitude from the ground they stand upon." 11 The dark mutterings against "that man in the vVhite House" are equally distracting if not equally elevating.
It appears, then, that the general feeling against the concentration of executive power should sometimes be discounted a llttle. We may at least try to distinguish between those who seek political power to protect economic privilege and those who seek it for the opposite reason. In so far as power is dangerous even when wielded by the latter, there are no safeguards beyond the mechanisms previously mentioned and the steady and active pressure of public opinion organized in many sections and expressing itself in many forms. If these safeguards seem inadequate and if as a result one should conclude that the risks are too great, it would be necessary to point out that these are risks which are inherent in the concentration of executive power for any purpose, and that that concentration has come to stay whether it is used for purposes of economic democracy or not. The danger is there, whether the thing is put to democratic purposes or not.
III
One of the forms which the pressure of one section of public opinion may take, is the participation of industrial workers in some aspects of the management of their industries, or, as it is some11Righ1s of Man, Pt. r. times called, industrial democracy. So far in this article we have been concerned mainly with only one level of proposals for economic democracy, that is, with proposals for the democratic control of the esonomy by bringing the economy under the control of a democratic state. I have discussed the two main sorts of these proposals and indicated some of the difficulties and possibilities of each. Both of them, as we have seen, accept the fact of the existing concentration of economic power and seek to bring it under the control of the democratic state by having the state take over the power at the points of concentration. vVe may now consider another level of proposals for economic democracy, namely proposals for the direct participation of labour in the control of the factory or the industry.
Such labour participation in the control of private industry-as is now possible can be regarded only as a supplement, though a valuable and necessary supplement, to the democratic political control or regulation of industry. Let us see what this labour participation in the control of industry nQW amounts to, and what its possibilities and limits are. It amounts to rather less than the phrase "participation in the control of industry" might seem to imply. Those who have built up the system of participation have not sought to take from the managers and owners any share in the economic control of the enterprise. Tliey have not attempted to share in the determination of price or sales or production policy. They have not, in other words, tried to take part in the entrepreneurial functions of the management, in the use to be made of the firm's capital. They have accepted the private ownership and management of the industries.
What they have tried to do is to democratize relations between management and employees within the factory and within the industry. They have tried to set up in each plant a constitutional monarchy, so to speak, instead of an irresponsible one; it is the Whig revolution in the factory. Where this has been achieved, the resulting situation is not of course a democracy; for the numerical majority does not control everything. What it means is that the workers in each shop or department, or in the fir:m as a whole and, if possible, in all the firms in that industry, choose representatives who uphold the employees' interests as against those of the management and who negotiate to secure certain rights which it is then their function to help administer.
The workers through their representatives may thus share with the management the control of working conditions, factory discipline, hiring and firing, and such things as the administration of a piece-rate system. Some of these functions can be carried out by shop councils, for instance, questions of the arrangement of work in each ·shop, the distribution of working hours, and the allotting of different types and pieces of work to different men in the shop. All except the most standardized type of large-scale production leaves room for this type of shop organization, and all except the quite small-scale units of production require it. It adds to the human stature of the worker; it also increases the efficiency of production in the plant. The shop council however is, under modern conditions, not self-sufficient. As the scale of industrial organization has increased, replacing the individual employer by the large imperson. al corporation which may control dozens or, through mergers and trusts, hundreds of plants, the scale of labour organization has had to increase also. Much of the protection of conditions of work, as w~ll as of wages, now depends on the negotiation of collective agreements, which must be the work of trade unions of the sort. we are now familiar with. The trade unions have become the essential instruments in the movement for more «industrial democracy" as that term is generally understood; that is, for the rearrangement of relations between management and employees. The right of labour to organize . in independent trade unions with officials of its own choice, the right of the unions to undertake collective bargaining with employers, and the right to strike, have after long struggle been recognized by all democratic states. Organized labour has always insisted, and democratic states have in recent decades admitted,' that these rights are necessary to prevent the human beings who in the mass are "the industrial labour force'' from being degraded to the status of machines, and it is clear that the .trade unions have done and can do a great deal to humanize the position of industrial workers. But there is still some question as to whether the trade unions ~re proper instruments for the achievement ·of economic democracy. Are they democratic themselves, and can they remain so? It will be generally granted that their purpose is democratic in the sense of our original definition of economic democracy; that is, the unions are pressing for certain arrangements within the economic system which are necessary means to a realization of the democratic end, the securing of an equal right of individuals to self-development". Further, the structure of trade unions is generally democratic, although there are some notorious exceptions among the American craft unions.
The question has frequently been raised, however, whether trade unions of the modern type are democratic in any other sense. On this continent the question has lately centred around the issue of the open shop versus the closed shop. In an open shop an employee is free to belong to a union or not; in a closed shop every employee is required, as a condition of employment, to belong to the union to which the majority of employees belong. The trend in the trade-union movement in America today seems to be in the direction of the closed shop. Those who oppose this trend argue that the closed shop is less democratic than the open shop, and that the trade-union movement is deserting the principles of democracy in moving towards the closed-shop principle. It is easy to see the main points of this argument. The closed shop, it is said, is undemocratic because it denies the individual worker the freedom to choose whether or not he will belong to a union and so be bound by the decisions of the majority within the union. Or else it is held that the closed shop is undemocratic because it prohibits the formation of a rival union by those who find an existing union unsatisfactory. Let us consider these arguments in turn.
There is no question that the closed-shop principle does deprive the individual of his freedom not to join a union; the minority are forced to join the union to which the majority belong. But to argue that the closed shop is therefore undemocratic, is fallacious. Democracy involves many restrictions on individual liberty; any form of state does so. In a democratic state, not only are all the citizens bound by the decision of the majority, as are all the members of a union; but further, no one has any effective choice whether he will belong to a state or not. Democracy, in other words, is not the same thing as individual freedom . It is easy to confuse democracy and freedom, since the end of democracy is the provision of the conditions for individual self-development, and these conditions may be stated as freedoms. But democracy, like any other form of government, is a matter of giving up some individual liberties in order to ensure other individual liberties which we think more important. Which liberties need to be given up will vary with changing social and economic conditions. The liberty of the individual to use his capital unrestrictedly was once regarded as one of the essential liberties which must be retained; now it is regarded as one of the liberties which must be given up if we are to retain the liberties essential to equal individual opportunities for selfdevelopment. Where does the liberty not to join a trade union stand? In modern conditions of large-scale organization I believe that the liberty not to join a trade union which the majority in the plant have joined, is one of the liberties that will have to be given up, in America at least, if the essential democratic liberties are to be secured. VVe have to think about this problem in terms of the situation that has actually developed, and on this continent it has developed along lines rather different from the British. In Great Britain the closed shop has not been a great issue because collective bargaining has been generally accepted by managements for several decades. But in America the demand for the closed shop has become very much part of, and sometimes almost identical with, the demand for collective bargaining, chiefly because American employers have tried (often succesSfully) to use an open-shop policy in order to stamp out trade unionism of any kind in their industries.
If the right not to join a trade union which the majority concerned have joined is a right which in the now developing American situation must be given up in order to achieve the more essential democratic ends, so too is the right to withdraw and form a directly competing union, and for similar reasons. On the practical level, where such a right is admitted it is likely to be invoked to weaken the trade-union movement. as a whole by playing off the unions against each other. This in itself is perhaps not a sufficient reason for urging the denial of the right; that a right or privilege is liable to abuse is not a sufficient reason for refusing to admit it at all, if 1t follows necessarily from an underlying principle which is agreed upon. Does the right to withdraw and form an alternative union follow necessarily from the democratic principle? A simple analogy between trade union and state would show that it is the right of secession that is in question here, a right which a democratic state does not normally recognize as pertaining to any minority of its citizens. Arguments by analogy, however, are notoriously misleading. In this case it might be argued that the analogy fails because the difference between a state and any other association is precisely that the state is the· one completely compulsory association and must be so from t.he nature of i.ts function. This shows the weakness of the argument by analogy; it shows also that reasoning from general principles is insufficient unless those principles include not only forms but purposes. It is the purpose, i.e. the functions, of the state which require its compulsory nature. Do the functions of trade unions require them to be compulsory to .the extent involved in the closed-shop principle? I have alre.ady shown reason to believe that they do require it in the situation which is developing in America, where the relation of management to unions makes it impossible in many cases for the unions to play their -part in enlarging economic democracy without the recognition of the closed shop.
In arguing that the closed shop is in these circumstances a necessary part of economic democracy I do not wish to overlook the undemocratic possibilities inherent in it. The real fear of some of those who oppose it is that, if the closed shop is widely established, the unions will become oligarchical, each within its own structure, and that there will be no remedy left to those members, perhaps a scattered majority, who radically disagree with the policy determined by a compact executive. Their last remedy, the formation of a rival union, would no longer .be available.
The danger of oligarchy is present in any large union, and the danger is somewhat greater where there is a closed shop because in that case the trade-union leader is less dependent, for the maintenance of his position, on the support of the union members than he is where the union has still a position to win. But the danger of oligarchy in the unions is the same -danger that besets any largescale organization which achieves a position of power in the community. The danger is inseparable from the size and power of the organization. It is the same danger that we noticed on the political level; a danger attendant on the increasing scope of governmental activity and power. Yet an increase in the size and in the power of both union.s and governments. appears to be required by the demands for economic democracy. If a union is to be an effective agency of economic democracy it must be powerful; if it reaches a position of sufficient power (through achieving union recognition, an-d the closed shop where that is necessary) its structure is in danger of becoming undemocratic. The danger is there, and it is a risk which will be run. For as the situation has developed now, full union recognition is essential to any considerable degree of economic democracy; until this recognition is granted, the unions will not be able to play a generally useful part as constructive, negotiating and labour-discipline-enforcing bodies.
* * *
To sum up, then, the movement for economic democracy 12 both on the political and on the industrial level requires the development of units of organization with an increasingly wider scope and with increasing power. The increase in scope! and in power which is necessary both in the state and in the trade unions brings with it the dangers of bureaucracy and oligarchy in both. But this is only to say that it is necessary to set an oligarch to catch an oligarch, and perhaps even a bureaucrat to catch a bureaucrat. The main source of hope, from the democratic point of view, is that none of these movements for economic democracy is apt to go far without being pressed by such a force of popular will as may be sufficient to keep the new.leaders responsive to popular control.
12 1 have said nothing about the co-operative movement, whose principles contain many of the essentials of economic democracy. Limitations of space forbid its discussion, since without venturing to give a judgment on the prospects of the co-operative movement in Canada, one may say that it is unlikely in the next decade to be as important as the movements which have been discussed here. ' r t is limitations of space, again, rather than absence of material, that has prevented any fuller consideration of specifically Canadian economic democracy, although it must be acknowledged that Canada lags behind other democratic countries in this matter. But the degree of econom1c democracy which is achieved here will depend as much on our appreciation of the basic issues and their main implications as it will on our knowledge of the Canadian situation.
